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Summary 
General Motors Corporation (Old GM) was a publicly traded company from 1916 until its 
bankruptcy in 2009. As part of restructuring, Old GM and its successor General Motors Company 
(New GM) together received over $50 billion in federal assistance through the U.S. government’s 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In exchange for this financial support, the U.S. Treasury 
received 60.8% of the new company, with the rest of New GM held by the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) retiree health care trust fund, the governments of Canada and Ontario, and holders of Old 
GM’s bonds. In its restructuring, GM closed plants, cut its hourly and salaried workforce, shed 
three brands, reduced debt, introduced popular new vehicles, and implemented changes to reduce 
retiree legacy costs, which had been a major financial drain. 
The federal government has sold its shares in General Motors Co. in two ways. In November 
2010, New GM conducted an initial public offering (IPO) of stock to investors, once again 
becoming a publicly traded company, although the post-bankruptcy owners, including the U.S. 
government, continued to hold significant stakes in the company. Of the 550 million shares sold 
in the IPO, the U.S. Treasury sold approximately 412 million, for which it received $13.5 billion. 
This sale left the U.S. Treasury owning 32% of the company’s common shares. The only capital 
New GM itself raised through the IPO was $4.9 billion from the simultaneous sale of preferred 
stock.  
In December 2012, the U.S. Treasury announced the sale of an additional 200 million shares 
priced at $27.50 per share ($2.00 per share above the market price on December 20, 2012). These 
shares were purchased directly by New GM itself for $5.5 billion, reducing the government’s 
ownership stake in New GM to 22%. At the same time, the Treasury announced that it expects to 
sell the remainder incrementally by March 2014 and that it has removed restrictions on New GM 
owning corporate jets as well as certain reporting requirements. TARP-imposed executive pay 
limits, however, will remain.  
GM is not the only company that received TARP funds as a result of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. More than 700 institutions received support, with the U.S. government taking ownership 
stakes in five large companies: GM, Chrysler, GMAC (now called Ally Financial), AIG, and 
Citigroup. In general, ownership of private companies was not a goal of TARP, and the U.S. 
government has sought to reduce its ownership stakes when possible while maximizing the 
taxpayers’ return from the assistance.  
The strength of New GM’s stock price, and the related recoupment of government assistance to 
the company, have hinged on two major factors: the success of GM’s restructuring and the 
performance of the global economy, including retail auto sales. New GM’s finances have 
improved markedly since its emergence from bankruptcy, and the company is once again 
consistently profitable. To date, the U.S. government has realized a $7.5 billion loss on its 
investment in General Motors. Future sale of the remaining 300 million GM shares could result in 
gains that would offset this loss. In order for the U.S. government to fully recoup the nominal 
value of its $50.2 billion assistance, however, the government’s remaining shares would need to 
sell for nearly $70 per share, well more than double the price that has been received by the U.S. 
government in past sales. 
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Introduction 
In 2008 and 2009, collapsing world credit 
markets and a slowing global economy 
combined to create the worst market in 
decades for production and sale of motor 
vehicles in the United States and other 
industrial countries. U.S. light vehicle 
production fell by more than 34% in 2009 
from 2008 levels, but the year-over-year fall-
off was more acute for General Motors 
Corporation (Old GM), whose U.S. 
production dropped by 48%, and for Chrysler 
LLC (Old Chrysler), whose U.S. production 
fell by 57%.2 A similar pattern was reflected in 
U.S. light vehicle sales, which fell from just 
over 16.5 million units in 2007 to only 10.4 
million units in 2009.3 
The production and sales slides were serious 
business challenges for all automakers, and 
rippled through the large and interconnected 
motor vehicle industry supply chain, touching 
suppliers, auto dealers, and the communities 
where auto-making is a major industry. Old 
GM and Old Chrysler were in especially 
precarious positions.4 The immediate crisis 
that brought these two companies to 
bankruptcy was a loss of financial liquidity as the banking system’s credit sources froze and 
neither company had enough internal reserves to weather the economic storm. As a result, they 
turned to the U.S. government for assistance in November 2008. 
In December 2008 and the early months of 2009, both automakers and two auto-financing 
companies5 received federal financial assistance from the Bush and Obama Administrations. As 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of U.S. government assistance to GMAC/Ally Financial, see CRS Report R41846, TARP Assistance 
for the U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: Unwinding the Government Stake in GMAC, by Baird Webel and Bill Canis.  
2 Other automakers’ U.S. production fell as well: Toyota’s by 28%, Honda’s by 27%, and Ford’s by 13%. Source: 
“North American Car and Truck Production,” Automotive News, January 11, 2010. GM and Chrysler sales in 2008 
were made by Old GM and Old Chrysler; 2009 sales include sales made by both entities before they filed for 
bankruptcy as well as sales made by new GM and new Chrysler after bankruptcy. 
3 U.S auto sales for most of the decade 2000-2009 were above 16 million units per year. Ward’s, Ward’s Motor Vehicle 
Facts & Figures 2009, “U.S. Retail Sales of Cars and Trucks.” 
4 For a full analysis of the decline in U.S. and other industrial country auto manufacturing during the recent recession, 
see CRS Report R41154, The U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: A Review of Recent Domestic and International 
Developments, by Bill Canis and Brent D. Yacobucci. 
5 At the time, Chrysler Financial and GMAC were both owned by Cerberus Capital Management.  
Corporate Terminology in This Report
As a result of bankruptcy proceedings, there are two 
companies commonly referred to as “GM.” Both are 
discussed in this report. General Motors Corporation 
filed for bankruptcy in June 2009. In this report, that 
company is referred to as “Old GM.” In July 2009, the 
majority of Old GM’s assets and some of its liabilities 
were purchased by a new entity that was subsequently 
renamed “General Motors Company.” In this report, it is 
referred to as “New GM.” The term “GM” is used when 
both companies are referenced. 
Similarly, there are two companies commonly referred 
to as “Chrysler.” Both are discussed in this report. 
Chrysler LLC filed for bankruptcy in April 2009. In this 
report, that company is referred to as “Old Chrysler.” In 
June 2009, the majority of Old Chrysler’s assets and 
some of its liabilities were purchased by a new legal 
entity that was subsequently renamed “Chrysler Group.” 
In this report, it is referred to as “New Chrysler.” The 
term “Chrysler” is used when both companies are 
referenced. 
GMAC, Inc., changed its general corporate identity to 
Ally Financial in May 2010, approximately a year after 
introducing the name Ally Bank for its banking subsidiary. 
Except for historical background and forward-looking 
statements, this report will refer to the corporation as 
GMAC/Ally Financial.1 
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discussed later in this report, that funding enabled Old GM and Old Chrysler to begin 
restructuring their operations, a process that was ultimately continued in bankruptcy court. 
Alone among the world’s major automakers, Old GM and Old Chrysler filed for bankruptcy in 
the summer of 2009 and, with oversight from the Obama Administration as well as the 
bankruptcy court, restructured their operations in an attempt to become more competitive 
companies. New boards of directors were appointed for both New GM and New Chrysler, with 
New GM’s board members initially chosen by the U.S. Treasury Department. Both reorganized 
companies had sizable ownership stakes held by the U.S. government and the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) union’s retiree healthcare trust.6 
As auto markets improved in 2010, so too did New GM’s balance sheet and its outlook. The 
company paid off its remaining $6.7 billion federal loan and repurchased $2.1 billion in preferred 
stock held by the U.S. government. This left the government holding over 900 million shares of 
common equity received in return for assistance from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
New GM’s stock was offered in the IPO in November 2010 for $33 per share, with the U.S. 
government selling over 412 million shares. Following the IPO, GM shares rose to a peak of over 
$39 per share in early 2011, and reached a low of $18.72 per share on July 25, 2012. 
The U.S. government renewed its interest in selling some of its remaining 500 million shares of 
New GM stock in December 2012 when it announced the sale of 200 million shares at $27.50 per 
share. The U.S. government received $5.5 billion from this sale and reduced its ownership stake 
in New GM to 22.0%.  
The amount of the original GM loans that the U.S. government will recoup will depend on the 
price it receives for the remaining 300 million shares. The Treasury has announced that it will sell 
these remaining shares by March 2014, subject to market conditions. The effective original cost 
of the U.S. government shares in New GM was approximately $43.50 per share. To break even 
following the previous sales at less than this amount, the Treasury would need to sell its 
remaining shares in New GM for an average price of nearly $70 a share. 
This report analyzes the crisis leading to Old GM’s bankruptcy, the U.S. government’s assistance 
to, and role in, the new company, the progress that General Motors Company has made since it 
was created, and the recoupment of the U.S. government’s assistance for GM. 
General Motors’ Capital Crisis in 2008-2009 
General Motors Corporation was a publicly traded company from 1916 until it filed for 
bankruptcy in June 2009.7 It faced a capital crisis in 2008 and 2009 because the normal avenues 
for raising capital were unavailable: auto sales were plummeting; the company had limited 
success in selling off assets; its efforts to cut costs were affected by the long timeline required to 
determine the efficacy of such steps; and sources of capital in the open market were frozen by the 
                                                 
6 See Error! Reference source not found. below for the details of the ownership structure of GM. For more 
information on Chrysler, see CRS Report R41940, TARP Assistance for Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment Issues, 
by Baird Webel and Bill Canis.  
7 William J. Holstein, Why GM Matters: Inside the Race to Transform an American Icon (Walker & Company, 2009), 
p. 4. 
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financial meltdown. As a consequence, the company’s executives tried to arrange U.S. 
government bridge loans beginning in the fall of 2008.8 As Old GM’s then-Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) Fritz Henderson stated in the company’s bankruptcy court filing: 
By the fall of 2008, [Old GM] was in the midst of a severe liquidity crisis, and its ability to 
continue operations grew more and more uncertain with each passing day. The Company 
previously has recognized the need for bold action to modify and transform its operations 
and balance sheet to create a leaner, more efficient, productive and profitable business; and 
it had expended a tremendous amount of resources and effort, on operational, strategic 
partnering, and financial fronts, to accomplish this task. Unfortunately, because of the 
continuing and deepening recession, aggravated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Holdings on September 15, 2008, GM was not able to achieve its objective. As a result of 
the economic crisis, the Company was compelled to seek financial assistance from the 
federal government.9 
When capital markets are functioning normally, companies might arrange for debt financing 
through a major investment bank. In 2007, Alan Mulally, Ford Motor Company’s president and 
CEO, arranged for Ford to borrow $23.5 billion to finance restructuring. Private capital was still 
available at that time, allowing Ford to mortgage all of its assets to obtain a large loan.  
As Old GM’s bankruptcy filing indicated, these avenues for raising capital were not available in 
2008 and 2009. By then, Old GM was facing extreme financial stress, for several reasons:  
• Decline in the U.S. auto market. In 2008 and the first half of 2009, U.S. auto 
sales were in a freefall, ultimately dropping further than at any time in three 
decades. The 2009 combined U.S. sales of Old GM and GM fell by 30% 
(compared with 2008 sales), a much steeper decline than any other automaker, 
except the combined sales of Old Chrysler and Chrysler.10 The decline in sales 
further dried up financial resources that Old GM could have utilized. 
• Steady loss of U.S. market share. General Motors—which at its peak sold 51% 
of all autos in the United States—saw its market share slide from over 28% in 
2000 and to under 20% in 2009 (see Table 1 below). 
Table 1. Top Sellers of Light Vehicles in the United States 
Share of units sold 
Company 2000  2009  2012 
General Motors 28.1%  19.9%  17.9% 
Toyota 9.3%  17.0%  14.4% 
Ford 23.1%  16.1%  15.5% 
Honda 6.6%  11.0%  9.8% 
                                                 
8 A bridge loan is a temporary, short-term loan made with the expectation that it will be repaid as soon as longer-term 
financing can be arranged. 
9 Affidavit of Frederick A. Henderson Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern 
District of New York, filed June 1, 2009. 
10 Automotive News, “US Car and Light Truck Sales by Make—12 Months 2009,” January 5, 2010, and “US Car and 
Light Truck Sales by Make—12 Months 2008,” January 12, 2009. 
The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
Company 2000  2009  2012 
Chrysler 11.7%  8.9%  11.4% 
Sources: “U.S. Light Vehicle Sales,” Market Data Book, Automotive News, 2002, and “U.S. Car and Light Truck 
Sales by Make, 2009 and 2012,” Automotive News. 
Notes: Ford data do not include Volvo, Land Rover, and Jaguar; GM data do not include Saab. Sales in 2000 are 
for Old GM and Old Chrysler. Sales in 2009 are the combined sales of Old GM/GM and Old Chrysler/Chrysler. 
• Break-even point for car making was too high. The break-even point is the 
volume of sales at which net sales (i.e., gross sales less discounts, returns, and 
freight costs) equal costs. According to Old GM, sales in the U.S. market would 
have needed to hit a rate of 11.5 million to 12 million vehicle units a year for it to 
break even.11 U.S. sales in 2009 were 10.4 million units.  
• Exceptional labor and retiree health care costs. The Detroit 3 automakers (Old 
GM, Ford, and Old Chrysler) negotiated contracts with the UAW over the years 
that expanded benefits for union workers to a level the companies could not 
sustain when imported vehicles began to take large shares of the U.S. market. Old 
GM estimated that its retiree health care and pension costs added $1,500 to the 
cost of every U.S.-made vehicle and exceeded the cost of the steel used in the 
vehicles.12 Old GM had obligations of nearly $30 billion to fully fund retiree 
health care and pension funds.13 
• Corporate culture. It was alleged at the time of bankruptcy that Old GM’s 
corporate executives had been too bureaucratic and out of touch with U.S. car 
buyers’ preferences. The Auto Task Force14 at the Treasury Department, which 
oversaw restructuring of Old GM (and Old Chrysler), repeatedly said that 
changing GM’s senior executive corps and the internal corporate culture would 
be one of the most important steps in Old GM’s transformation to a more 
competitive company. The Obama Administration’s firing of Old GM’s then-
chairman and CEO, Rick Wagoner, in 2009, and its appointment of new board 
members and a new chairman and CEO, were intended, in part, to emphasize to 
all stakeholders the importance of changing the business model. 
• Higher gasoline prices. In 2008, gasoline prices rose to over $4 a gallon in many 
parts of the United States, adversely affecting demand for large vehicles with low 
fuel efficiency. These vehicles, such as pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles, 
had been critical to Old GM’s profitability.15 
                                                 
11 Jeff Green and Caroline Salas, “GM Said to Speed Cutbacks to Lower Break-Even Point,” Bloomberg, April 22, 
2009, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aOloQhPHrqX0&pid=newsarchive. 
12 Julie Appleby and Sharon Silke Carty, “Ailing GM Looks to Scale Back Generous Health Benefits,” USA Today, 
June 23, 2005. 
13 Bill Visnic, “UAW Cornered on VEBA?,” Edmunds, February 27, 2009, at http://www.autoobserver.com/2009/02/
uaw-cornered-on-veba.html. 
14 The Auto Task Force was established by the Obama Administration in February 2009. It is chaired by Treasury 
Secretary Geithner and composed of officials from a wide range of U.S. government agencies, including the 
departments of Labor, Commerce, and Transportation. On a day-to-day basis, the task force was managed for most of 
2009 by Steven Rattner, and in 2010 by Ron Bloom. Timothy Massad, Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, 
currently oversees the implementation and wind-down of TARP. 
15 Affidavit of Frederick A. Henderson, part of General Motors filing in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District 
of New York, June 1, 2009, pp. 18-19. 
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U.S. Government Assistance to the 
Motor Vehicle Industry 
The initial U.S. government loans to assist the U.S. motor vehicle and motor vehicle financing 
industries were made by the George W. Bush Administration in December 2008 and January 
2009. At that time, $24.8 billion in assistance was provided to the four companies,16 the first of 
what would eventually total nearly $80 billion in assistance through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program.17 TARP was authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA),18 
enacted in the fall of 2008 to address the ongoing financial crisis. This statute specifically 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets from “financial firms,” the 
definition of which did not mention manufacturing companies.19 According to the Treasury, 
The overriding objective of EESA was to restore liquidity and stability to the financial 
system of the United States in a manner which maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers. 
Consistent with the statutory requirement, Treasury’s four portfolio management guiding 
principles for the TARP are: (i) protect taxpayer investments and maximize overall 
investment returns within competing constraints; (ii) promote stability for and prevent 
disruption of financial markets and the economy; (iii) bolster market confidence to increase 
private capital investment; and (iv) dispose of investments as soon as practicable, in a timely 
and orderly manner that minimizes financial market and economic impact.20 
The authorities within TARP were very broad. When Congress did not pass specific auto industry 
loan legislation,21 the Bush Administration turned to TARP for funding, arguing that failure to 
provide assistance to the auto industry would make the recession much worse and would impose 
other costs on federal taxpayers, such as providing unemployment benefits for displaced workers.  
After it took office, in 2009, the Obama Administration built on this precedent and both Chrysler 
and GM received additional TARP loans. GMAC/Ally Financial received additional capital 
infusions, enabling the company to survive the downturn in the auto market as well as large 
losses on its mortgage operations. Chrysler Financial, in contrast, required no additional aid and 
relatively quickly repaid the TARP loan it received. The assistance for the auto industry was not 
without controversy, and questions were raised about the legal basis for the assistance and the 
manner in which it was carried out.22 
                                                 
16 The loan recipients and the initial loans they received from the Bush Administration in December 2008 and January 
2009 were as follows: General Motors Corporation ($14.3 billion), Chrysler LLC ($4 billion), GMAC ($5.0 billion), 
and Chrysler Financial ($1.5 billion).  
17 According to the Treasury Department, $410 billion of the authorized $700 billion TARP fund has been disbursed, of 
which 75% has been recovered. The Treasury Department maintains an ongoing tally of all TARP assistance and 
recoupment, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/Pages/Home.aspx. 
18 P.L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
19 P.L. 110-343, Division A, Section 3. 
20 TARP, “Monthly 105(a) Report to Congress,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2010, p. 10. 
21 In December 2008, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 7321, authorizing the use of certain Department of 
Energy funds as bridge loans to GM and Chrysler. Passed 237-170, the bill was not acted upon in the Senate. For a 
complete description of Congress’s consideration of auto industry loan legislation in the fall of 2008, see CRS Report 
R40003, U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: Federal Financial Assistance and Restructuring, coordinated by Bill Canis. 
22 See, for example, Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), September Oversight Report: The Use of TARP Funds in 
Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry, September 9, 2009. This panel was created by the 
(continued...) 
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Table 2 summarizes the TARP assistance given to the U.S. motor vehicle manufacturing and 
financing industries.23 
Table 2. Summary of TARP Assistance for U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry 
Company 
Current 
Government 
Ownership 
Share 
Total 
TARP 
Assistance 
Principal 
Recouped 
to Date by 
the 
Treasury 
Principal 
Losses 
Realized by 
the 
Treasury 
Income/Revenue 
Received from 
TARP 
Assistance 
Outstanding 
TARP 
Assistance 
Chrysler 0% $10.9 
billion 
$7.9 billion -$2.9 billion $1.7 billion $0 
Chrysler 
Financial 
Not 
Applicable 
$1.5  
billion 
$1.5 billion $0 $0.02 billion $0 
GM 22.0%
(New GM) 
$50.2 
billion 
$28.7 billion -$7.5 billion $0.8 billion $13.9 billion 
GMAC/Ally 
Financial 
73.8% $17.2 
billion 
$2.5 billion $0 $3.3 billion $14.6 billion 
Source: U.S. Treasury, Daily TARP Update, December 26, 2012; Troubled Asset Relief Program: Monthly 105(a) 
Report, various dates. 
Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. In December 2008, the U.S. Treasury provided $884 million to 
assist GM in GMAC’s rights offerings, separate from the funds loaned for GM’s operations. While the funds were 
provided to GM, they are included in the GMAC/Ally assistance as they resulted in government ownership of 
35% of GMAC. 
U.S. Government Assistance for GM Through 
Bankruptcy 
In December 2008, Old GM received $13.4 billion from the U.S. Treasury, the first of several 
loans made through TARP. Old GM received additional loans from TARP of $2 billion in April 
and $4 billion in May 2009. These loans kept Old GM’s operations alive as it went through a 
drastic restructuring overseen by the Auto Task Force. (A complete listing of GM’s TARP loans 
and related payments to the government can be found in the Appendix.) 
Old GM’s Viability Plan of February 2009, which was a U.S. Treasury requirement to obtain 
additional loans after the initial loan of December 2008, laid out a plan of recovery based on 
changes in operations, labor costs, and other factors. President Obama rejected that plan at the 
end of March 2009, saying it was insufficient for a total recovery of the company. The 
Administration gave Old GM two months, until June 1, to devise a more thorough restructuring 
and thereby qualify for more U.S. government aid.24 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. COP’s statutory authorization and website have expired, but its 
reports can be found at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401222823/http:/cop.senate.gov/. 
23 A more detailed accounting of the assistance for GM can be found in CRS Report R41401, General Motors’ Initial 
Public Offering: Review of Issues and Implications for TARP, by Bill Canis, Baird Webel, and Gary Shorter. 
24 Old Chrysler’s Viability Plan was also rejected by the Obama Administration, and it was given 30 days to 
(continued...) 
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Throughout the spring of 2009, Old GM worked with various stakeholders, including the UAW, 
bondholders, creditors, dealers, and suppliers, to devise a new restructuring plan that would be 
approved by the Auto Task Force and avert bankruptcy. While the company succeeded in 
reaching tentative agreements with most stakeholders, a group of creditors would not agree to the 
terms offered, thus prompting GM to file for bankruptcy on June 1, 2009. 
During the bankruptcy proceedings, the government provided a final installment from TARP: a 
$30 billion loan to facilitate the transformation to a new, smaller company, bringing total U.S. 
government loans related to GM to more than $50 billion. While much of the $30 billion was 
used by GM during the restructuring process, a majority of it was not used, and $16.4 billion 
remained in an escrow account on September 30, 2009.25 
GM also benefited financially during and after the bankruptcy process from previous policy 
rulings by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).26 Under normal circumstances, a corporation 
undergoing bankruptcy is not able to carry forward previous tax losses, since the bankruptcy 
process is considered a change in the control of the company.27 Government holdings through 
TARP, however, generally have not been treated by the IRS as causing such a change in control. 
Because of this, New GM was able to carry forward $45 billion in losses and other costs incurred 
by Old GM, allowing it to avoid paying taxes on future profits for up to 20 years. Included in this 
figure are net operating losses of approximately $16 billion.28 These tax savings are not counted 
as part of TARP support. In theory, these tax rulings should make the ownership stake held by the 
U.S. Treasury more valuable. To whatever degree these tax savings do increase the value of New 
GM, this benefit would also accrue to other common shareholders. 
Post-Bankruptcy General Motors 
A new company was established in July 2009, after just 40 days in federal bankruptcy 
proceedings. New GM began with smaller U.S. operations than its predecessor company and a 
major presence overseas. GM operates as four divisions: GM North America (GMNA), GM 
Europe (GME), GM South America (GMSA), and GM International Operations (GMIO). In 
2012, over 47% of GM’s vehicle sales were outside North America and Europe, primarily in 
developing countries in Asia. In China alone in the first 11 months of 2012, GM’s joint ventures 
there sold 2.6 million vehicles, approximately 30% of all its worldwide sales. In 2010, GM sales 
in China exceeded those in the United States for the first time.29 
Table 3 shows GM’s second-quarter sales and earnings worldwide over the past three years, 
comparing second quarter results of each year. It is noteworthy that GM’s North American sales 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
restructure.  
25 General Motors Company, Form 10-Q Quarterly Report, April 7, 2010, p. 37. 
26 The IRS issued several notices on this issue, including Notice 2008-100, I.R.B. 2008-44, October 14, 2008; Notice 
2009-14, I.R.B. 2009-7, January 30, 2009; Notice 2009-38, I.R.B. 2009-18, April 13, 2009; and Notice 2010-2, I.R.B. 
2010-2, December 14, 2009. 
27 The tax code generally does not permit such assumption of tax losses in order to discourage companies from making 
acquisitions solely for the purpose of assuming tax losses. 
28 “GM’s Tax Shelter,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2009. 
29 “GM’s China Sales Pass U.S. for First Time in History,” The Economic Times, January 24, 2011. 
The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors 
 
Congressional Research Service 8 
are more lucrative, as the larger cars, pickup trucks, and SUVs sold in North America carry 
higher profit margins than the smaller vehicles sold elsewhere in the world. Of the $2.1 billion 
earned in the second quarter of 2012, $2.0 billion was earned in North America. The other 
divisions lost money, broke even, or saw only a small profit. 
Table 3. General Motors Company Results 
Comparing 2Q 2010, 2011 and 2012 
 Net Revenue Vehicles Sold 
Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes 
Total 
2Q 2010 
2Q 2011 
2Q 2012 
 
$33.2 billion 
$39.4 billion 
$37.6 billion 
 
2.2 million 
2.3 million 
2.4 million 
 
$2.0 billion 
$3.0 billion 
$2.1 billion 
Source: GM Earnings Chart Set, August 4, 2011, and August 2, 2012.  
Notes: Revenues are before intercompany transfers and corporate and other eliminations. GM’s second quarter 
is April-June. 
According to GM’s 2011 Annual Report, it has “announced investments in 29 U.S. facilities, 
totaling more than $7.1 billion since July 2009, with more than 17,500 jobs created or retained.”30 
The same report provides its worldwide employment as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. General Motors Co. Worldwide Employment 
Yearend, in thousands 
GM Unit 2010 2011 
GMNA 96 98 
GME 40 39 
GMIO 32 34 
GMSA 31 33 
GM Financial 3 3 
Total Worldwide 202 207 
Source: “Highlights,” Vision in Motion, General Motors Company 2011 
Annual Report, p. 4. 
The New GM of 2009 differed in a number of ways from the Old GM:31 
• Employment was cut. Old GM had 91,000 U.S. employees in 2008; new GM had 
75,000 immediately after bankruptcy. Its worldwide employment fell from 
243,500 to 209,000 during the same time period. 
                                                 
30 Daniel F. Akerson, Chairman and CEO, “Letter to Stockholders,” in Vision in Motion, General Motors Company 
2011 Annual Report, p. 2. 
31 Old GM—General Motors Corporation—remains in bankruptcy and is officially the Motors Liquidation Company, 
with the assets and liabilities that were not attached to the new General Motors Company. 
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• Plants were closed. Old GM announced that, of the 47 U.S. plants it operated in 
2008, 13 would close by 2010. The closed plants and machinery remained with 
Old GM. 
• Brands were shed. The Pontiac, Saturn, and Hummer brands were terminated, 
and Saab was sold to a Dutch company. Among its remaining brands, GM’s U.S. 
market share fell from 22% in 2008 to 19.8% in 2009 and further declined to 
19.1% in 2010. In 2011, GM’s market share rose to 19.7% but dropped to 17.9% 
in 2012.32 In addition, its sales in China rose by nearly 30% in 2010, exceeding 
U.S. sales for the first time.  
• Health care costs for retired U.S. union workers were transferred to the UAW. 
Old GM reached agreement with the UAW in 2007 to transfer the financial 
responsibility for U.S. hourly workers’ retiree health care to the union’s VEBA 
(Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association), thus removing $30 billion in 
obligations. The UAW signed similar agreements with Ford and Old Chrysler. 
The Detroit 3 agreed to fund the VEBAs with cash or stock. The union made 
additional concessions concerning retiree health care in 2009 negotiations. The 
GM restructuring agreement gave the VEBA a significant ownership stake in GM 
because the company did not have the financial resources to provide cash. 
• Many expensive liabilities were jettisoned. Left with Old GM were 
environmental liabilities estimated at $350 million for polluted properties, 
including Superfund sites; certain tort liability claims, including those for some 
product defects and asbestos; and contracts with suppliers with whom New GM 
would not be doing business. 
The U.S. government was the majority owner of the company that emerged from the bankruptcy 
process, as the majority of the TARP loans made to GM were converted into an initial 60.8% 
government ownership stake in New GM. In addition, $6.7 billion of the TARP loans remained 
outstanding after the bankruptcy and the U.S. government received $2.1 billion in preferred 
stock.33 Following positive financial results in the quarters after emerging from bankruptcy, New 
GM used cash in the escrow account that held its TARP borrowings to pay off the $6.7 billion in 
outstanding loans by April 2010.34 The $2.1 billion in preferred stock was repurchased by New 
GM in December 2010, following the company’s IPO.35 
                                                 
32 In the first six months of 2011, New GM’s light vehicle sales accounted for 19.9% of the market, compared to 16.9% 
for Ford, 12.8% for Toyota, 10.1 for New Chrysler and 9.6% for Honda. The current market shares of these five 
automakers can be compared with the shares in 2009, as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. Sourced from 
the Automotive News database.  
33 Preferred stock is an equity instrument, but it does not confer any control over the company and typically has a set 
dividend rate to be paid by the company; it is similar economically to debt, except that in most cases the issuer may 
waive dividend payments on preferred stock under certain circumstances. 
34 According to the Special Inspector General for TARP, “all of these payments were made, with Treasury’s 
permission, using funds from the escrow account that held TARP funds provided to GM.” “Quarterly Report to 
Congress,” Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), July 21, 2010, 
p. 108. 
35 U.S. Treasury, “General Motors to Repurchase Treasury Preferred Stock,” press release, October 28, 2010, 
http://financialstability.gov/latest/pr_10282010.html. 
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Elements of U.S. Government Ownership 
In addition to its ownership of GM, the U.S. government acquired large common ownership 
stakes in Chrysler, GMAC/Ally Financial, Citigroup, and AIG through TARP funds and other 
assistance during the financial crisis. It has sold its stakes in Citigroup, Chrysler, and AIG but 
retains large common shareholdings in the other companies. Table 5 details the government 
ownership stakes in these companies. 
Exercising managerial control was not a stated goal of the shareholdings in these companies. 
Instead, the stated purpose was to compensate taxpayers for the assistance given the companies 
while not saddling the companies with large liabilities that could hinder recovery. The Obama 
Administration laid out four core principles to guide the management of the government’s 
ownership stakes: 
• The government has no desire to own equity any longer than necessary, and will 
seek to dispose of its ownership interests as soon as practicable. 
• In exceptional cases where the government feels it is necessary to respond to a 
company’s request for substantial assistance, the government will reserve the 
right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability, 
and encourage growth. 
• After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will manage its 
ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner. 
• As a common shareholder, the government will only vote on core governance 
issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors and major 
corporate events or transactions.36 
Disposing of large ownership stakes in companies can be done in a variety of manners, including 
large-scale public offerings of shares, negotiated sales of large blocks of shares to other entities, 
and gradual share sales in the stock market. All of these sales methods have been used by the 
government in disposing of holdings of the companies discussed here. Following its emergence 
from bankruptcy, New GM was not publicly traded, thereby precluding a gradual sale of stock 
into the stock market, as was done in the case of the U.S. government’s holdings in Citigroup. 
The size of the company and of the government’s stake in New GM made a negotiated private 
sale to another entity unlikely, and any private sale would have been subject to questions about 
whether the government received a fair price. Thus, the U.S. government chose to participate in 
an initial public offering in which it and other shareholders could sell significant amounts of their 
GM stock. In December 2012, the U.S. government also sold 200 million shares directly to GM at 
a 7.9% premium over the market price at the time. It has not indicated exactly how it will sell the 
remaining 300 million shares, although a target date of March 2014 has been announced for the 
sale of all GM shares held by the U.S. government. 
                                                 
36 U.S. Treasury, “FACT SHEET: Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative,” press release, June 1, 2009, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/05312009_gm-factsheet.html. 
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Table 5. Companies in which the U.S. Government held Large Stakes under TARP 
Company 
Current Government 
Ownership Share 
Maximum Government 
Ownership Share 
Method of Sale of 
Ownership Stake 
GM 22.0% 60.8% 
Initial public offering, sale 
to GM, 
and future gradual sale of 
stock 
Chrysler 0% 9.9% Negotiated sale 
GMAC/Ally Financial 73.8% 73.8% Not determined 
AIG 0% 92% Secondary public offering and gradual sale of stock 
Citigroup 0% 34% Gradual sale of stock 
Source: U.S. Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Monthly 105(a) Report, various dates. 
Note: Some of the government ownership in AIG resulted from a Federal Reserve loan, not from TARP 
assistance.  
Figure 1 shows the ownership structure of GM in 2009 when the new company emerged from 
bankruptcy and its current structure after the U.S. Treasury sold 200 million shares in December 
2012.  
Figure 1. GM Ownership Structure 
2009 vs. 2013 
 
Source: General Motors Company. 
Note: The 2009 ownership structure is how the new company emerged from bankruptcy.  
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Recouping U.S. Government Aid to GM 
As detailed in the Appendix, the U.S. government through TARP has aided the combined Old 
GM and New GM with more than $50 billion in loans since December 2008. Of this amount, $7.4 
billion was repaid in installments.37 An additional $2.1 billion was converted into shares of 
preferred stock held by the U.S. Treasury which were redeemed in December 2010. The 
approximately $40.7 billion remaining was effectively converted into an initial 60.8% equity 
stake.38 The partial sale of this stock has returned approximately $19 billion and the U.S. Treasury 
has received approximately $0.8 billion in dividends and interest along with approximately $0.1 
billion in other recoveries from the bankruptcy process of Old GM. 39 
Offsetting the original $50.2 billion in loan principal with the total of repayments, recoveries and 
other income leaves approximately $20.7 billion to be recouped. The government now holds 
approximately 300 million shares, or 22.0% of GM’s common equity. In order for the 
government’s remaining 22.0% of the company to be worth $20.7 billion, the price of GM stock 
would need to rise to nearly $70 per share, well more than double what the U.S. government has 
received for its previous sales of GM stock. If the Treasury follows through on its announced plan 
of selling the remaining stock by early 2014, it would require an extraordinary rise in GM stock 
for the government to recoup the total nominal value of its assistance to GM.  
Whether or not the government is able to sell the remaining common shares at a sufficient price 
to recoup the assistance provided to GM is not the sole measure of whether the government 
shows a gain or loss on the assistance. In assessing the extent to which the government has 
recovered its investment, economists might also include a number of other factors, such as the 
cost to the government to borrow the funds that it then provided to GM, a premium to compensate 
the government for the riskiness of the loans, and the cost to the government of managing the 
assistance given. 
The budgetary scores produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of 
Management of Budget (OMB) take many of these additional factors into account. The TARP 
statute required that TARP assistance be scored on the government budget in a similar manner to 
loans and loan guarantees under the Federal Credit Reform Act.40 Specifically, the expected 
present value of actions under TARP is to be estimated using market, risk-adjusted rates and 
reflected on the federal budget at that time. The estimates produced according to these formulas, 
however, have only been reported in aggregate. For example, CBO estimated in October 2012 
that the budget cost of the TARP assistance for the entire auto industry would be $20 billion,41 
and the Treasury in coordination with OMB estimated lifetime cost as of September 30, 2012, to 
be $24 billion.42 Neither of these analyses, however, reports separately the individual gains or 
                                                 
37 Seven installments were paid between November 2009 and July 2010.  
38 Approximately $1 billion of the debt remained legally owed by Old GM; however, little of this has been recovered 
through the bankruptcy process. 
39 Proceeds from all TARP repayments, such as the sales of GM stock, are specified by the TARP statute to “be paid 
into the general fund of the Treasury for reduction of the public debt.” per P.L. 110-343, §106(d). 
40 2 U.S.C. 661-661f. 
41 Congressional Budget Office, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program—October 2012, October 11, 2012, p. 4, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/TARP10-2012_0.pdf. 
42 U.S. Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Monthly 105(a) Report—November 2012, December 10, 2012, p. 5, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
(continued...) 
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losses on Chrysler, GM, and GMAC/Ally Financial. These estimates were made before the 
Treasury sold 200 million GM shares in December 2012.  
Conclusion 
After credit markets tightened and the recession reduced auto sales in the fall of 2008, General 
Motors restructured through bankruptcy and began operation as a new company in July 2009. The 
Bush and Obama Administrations used TARP funds to provide capital to General Motors during 
this time, ultimately receiving in exchange a majority ownership stake in the company. Without 
the U.S. government assistance, GM would not have been able to pay creditors, suppliers, or 
workers and would most likely have entered bankruptcy earlier with a less certain outcome. 
TARP support enabled it to reorganize itself in a more orderly manner and may have reduced 
collateral damage to many auto suppliers and some of the other automakers that bought parts 
from them. However, it exposed the U.S. government to the risk that not all the assistance would 
be recovered.  
Not long after it began operation as a new company after bankruptcy, New GM and the U.S. 
Treasury agreed that there should be an initial public offering of New GM stock in the latter half 
of 2010. The IPO, selling 500 million shares of New GM stock, was the first step in removing 
New GM from government ownership. The GM IPO on November 18, 2010, was widely 
considered a success, occurring at a price of $33 a share, well above GM’s initial target price of 
$25-$26 per share. In addition, more shares were sold than originally intended due to the strength 
of investor demand. As a result, the government was able to recoup more money than had been 
anticipated, although it realized losses on those shares nonetheless. 
Even following the IPO, the U.S. government, the government of Canada, GM pension fund, and 
the UAW VEBA trust owned nearly half of GM. With the U.S. government’s sale of GM stock in 
December 2012, private investors now own the majority of New GM stock (51.8%) for the first 
time since the bankruptcy. The U.S. Treasury’s December 2012 announcement also moves New 
GM further away from government control in other ways, as Treasury agreed to waive certain 
restrictions on the company— such as the ban on purchasing private jets and requirements for 
specified levels of U.S. manufacturing. Caps on executive pay, which GM has said adversely 
affect its ability to retain and attract talent, will remain. 
The nominal amount of its assistance to GM that the government has yet to recover is $20.7 
billion (counting recoupment of principal and income received, as shown in the Appendix). As 
the government’s entire holding in GM is now in the form of common shares, its ability to recoup 
that sum will depend solely upon GM’s share price, which in turn depends heavily on investor 
perceptions of GM’s future profitability. GM’s shares would need to approach $70 per share for 
the government to recoup the entire nominal amount of TARP assistance, well above the share 
price at any time since GM reemerged as a publicly traded company. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
stability/reports/Documents/November%202012%20Monthly%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
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Appendix.  U.S. Government Financial Support for 
GM through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
Date Recipient/Source 
Amount  
($ in billions) 
December 2008 Old GM $13.4 
April 2009 Old GM $2.0 
May 2009 Old GM 
GM Warranty Program 
$4.0 
$0.4 
June 2009 Old GM/New GM $30.1 
April 2009-April 2010 GM Supplier Receivables Program $0.3 
Total Funds Loaned  $50.2 
Recoupment of Principal 
November 2009 Partial repayment of Supplier Receivables loans $0.1 
December 2009/January 2010 Partial debt repayment $1.0 
February 2010 Partial repayment of Supplier Receivables loans $0.1 
March 2010 Partial debt repayment  $1.0 
April 2010 Final debt repayment 
Final repayment of Supplier Receivables loans 
$4.7 
$0.1 
July 2010 Repayment for Warranty Program $0.4 
November 2010 Proceeds from sale of common equity $13.5 
December 2010 Repurchase of preferred stock $2.1 
March 2011-October 2012 Partial Repayment from bankruptcy proceeds $0.1 
December 2012 Proceeds from sale of common equity $5.5 
Total   $28.7 
Income Received 
December 2008-April 2009 Interest on Old GM loans $0.1 
April 2009-April 2010 Interest for GM Supplier Receivables $0.01 
March 2010 Additional Note for GM Supplier Receivables  $0.1 
October 2009-April 2010 Interest on New GM loans $0.3 
September 2009-December 2010 Dividends on preferred stock $0.3 
December 2010 Gain on preferred stock sale $0.04 
Total  $0.8 
Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily TARP Update for 12/27/2012, TARP Transactions Reports, various 
dates, and TARP Dividends and Interest Report, various dates. 
Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. In December 2008, the U.S. Treasury provided $884 million to 
assist GM in GMAC’s rights offerings, separate from the $13.4 billion loaned for GM’s operations. While this was 
provided to GM is not tallied here as it ultimately resulted in holdings of GMAC common equity. 
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